Roots of traditional progressivism still off er the best ba· sis of building a sound view of education.
Educational theory in the remainder of the century By Jerome A. Popp
As we enter the 1980s it seems appropriate to reflect upon the natu re o f our inquiry-as it was, is, and shou ld be in the future. I want to suggest that it is time to seriously reconsider the tenets of educational pro· gressivism. I will not be suggesting that we simply iden· tlfy educational progressivism as it existed in the first 20 years of this century and reinstate it in the last 20 years; what I hope to show is that the roots of traditional progressivism still offer the best basis for building a sound view of education for now and the future. It behooves us to view our work as growi ng out of traditional progressivism and toward a neoprog ressivism.
The Present Scene
At th is time we can look around and find: " humanistic education"'-the " hands off" view of pedagogy and schooling-wobbling without a clear direction. Perhaps its followers have mad e their points and are now at a loss as to what to do nex t. This is plausible, for humanistic doctrine is philosophically thin , lacking the comprehen· siveness or penetration to support prolonged action. I shall return to this view in the third section of the present paper.
The transmissionist or impositional view-hu· manism's historical adversary-seems to be healthy with educational technology, i.e., the technology of pedagogical imposi tion, continuing to attract great au· diences. The brutalness of imposition reflec ted in the Hoosier's School Master's reading , 'riting , and 'rithmetic taught to the tune of a hickory stick, seems to be in vogue 24 again in " back to basics." It seems to me that the trans· mission view with its ever-present technology Is pres· ently in position of the greatest momentum with regard to schooling and school policy-making. If we education· lsts allow the present trend to fulfill itself we can expect to find impositional lh<:lory dominating the 1980s.
Optimists will say that humanistic education is less noticeable at present because many o f its princ iples have become internalized by the establishmen t. Yet anyone who is at all sensitive to !be notion of logical consistency must doubt this; how can human istic principles be in· ternal ized by teachers who are taking more and more o f an educational technological view of things?
If impositionism is to continue to dominate peda· gogical practice, then we must be prepared to accept its consequences. In modern social life, more than any other time in human history, Imposition is met with resistance. Conceptually, imposition and resistance are rec iprocal notions. When you are imposed upon, you resist; when school child ren and young adults are im· posed upon they resist. The transmission theory and its supported pract ice c learly identifies imposition. We are less familiar with Its reciprocal resis tance. But let us examine it.
Resistance can take t wo basic forms: active and passive. Active resis tance attempts to disrupt the im· position, weakening its impact. Passive resistance allows imposition to manifest itself but seeks to lessen its im · pact by giving It no target. In school, active resis ters are " d isc ipline problems," while passive resisters are "mo· tivation problems." School authority knows how to deal with active resistance. But passive resistance is enigma. Passive resistance draws no punishment, just ignoral. Yet, passive resistance has its price-it's boring.
• .... , -.8.ecent attent ion has focused upon the use o f drugs by secondary, junior high and even elementary students. It is not possible that through the use of drugs the docil ity required by transmissional imposition becomes bearable? As far as I can determine, no drug usage studies exist which consider the type o f pedagogy as an independent variable. Yet, is it not plausible that drug usage is rendered effective given the impositional nature of the schooling environment? This is a significant area of empirical re· search which, as I see it, deserves our attention in the 1980's. If, as I am suggesting, drug usage is patterned ac· cord ing to pedagogical imposition, then this alone is evi· dence against impositionism in schooling.
The Transmission View of Schooling
There has always been wi th us, from Protagorus to Gagne, a transmission view of pedagogy and schooling. If one asks the average adult or undergraduate, " What are the purposes of the school or teaching?" one invariably receives a tradit ional transmissionist account of the ends of schooling. This tradition is quite strong and dom inates , as near as I can tell, the thinking of the typical person . Yet, transmissionism has not remained static and \vas noticeably modified at the midpoint of this c entury. For this reason it is best to review transm issionism in two parts: traditional and modern.
Traditional Transmissionism
In the time of the ancients, there were established cultural facts and values into which chi ldren could be initiated. Since the content transmitted was stable and noncontroversial, the initiat ion process seemed straight forward . By the late nineteenth century, John Dewey Winter, 1980 challenged this process. His classic Democracy and Education and his equally important Interest and Effort in Education, both published in the second decade of the twentieth century, constituted formidable opposition to straight transmisslonl sm.
The end of transmissionism, (i) a body of knowledge and skill, and (Ii) standards of conduct, whether pursued by the " Effort Theory" (or formal discipline) or the "In· terest Theory" (or sugar coating the bitter pill) was at· tacked by Dewey in the classic argument that the object was assumed to be apart and alien to the developing child, and that all experience with children denied this assump· lion. As an alternative view. a new view o f schooling was propounded -progressive education.
While Dewey's arguments keep traditional trans· missionism on the ropes for the first third o f the twen· tleth century-it was never knocked out-the extreme child-centered wing of the Progressive Education Association undermined his attack. After all, If the project of study was part of the chi ld's nature, why not keep handsoff and let th ings unfold according to nature's plan? Dewey's attack on the impositionism o f the transmission view ironically cleared the way for permlssivism. Dewey, of course, was attacking both imposltlonism and the romantic hands·off approach when he claimed "psychotogized " the child. Yet when one reads his words today, the attack upon the impositionism of transmission thinking seems to receive the heaviest blows.
Modern Transmisslonlsm
At midcentury Ralph Tyler laid out his curriculum technology and it received a strong positive response. There had been earlier transmisslonlsts who sought efficiency, but by Tyler' s time there seemed to be less opposition. Tylerian technology sought to improve outcomes by improving means.
A decade later The Process ot Education appeared, which of course originated " the structure of the disciplines movement" in curriculum development. If we could clarify the ends, the means would follow. Aim for the basic s truc ture, and chi ldren will be released somehow to become little scienti sts and mathematicians. Child psychologists were out and Ph.0.'s from the disciplines were in . It is as if the arts and sciences professors had finally won over professors of education, and they walked with arrogance through the captured public schools. · Yet things did not go as predicted. In 1971 Bruner, in " The Process of Education Revisited," took it all back. I believe I would be quite satisfied to declare, if not a moratorium , then som ething of a de· emphasis on matters that have to do with the structure of history, the structure of physics, the nature of mathematical consistency, and deal with it rather in the contex t of the problems that face us.' If Einstein could ask Newton's forgiveness for being right, Bruner should have asked for Dewey's for being wrong.
While the structure of the disciplines movement has faded in science and mathematics, It Is somewhat alive In philosophy. From Kohlberg's moral development theory and Lipman's Philosophy for Children movement, one expects to find some teachers viewing value and/or moral education the way the structure of the disciplines teachers viewed their subjects. I am not claiming that Winier, 1980 Kohlberg or Lipman and their theoretical associates are " Jonnie·come·lately's" to Brunerism. This is not the case. But I am concerned that some users of these ideas may fall into the same view as the earlier Bruneri tes; namely, some may come to view their task as trying to get the student to discover or build th e basic structures o f moral reasoning like math and physics were supposed to be built. Whether we should have moral curricula, or what form they should take is not my point: I only want to warn against making the same mistakes contained in the structure of the disciplines approach-thinking that curriculum organization and materials are all that are required, whi le Ignoring educational psychology and teacher effective· ness research. · By the late 1960's, behaviorism and educational tech · nology (actually pedagogical technology) were growing strong. As the structure of the d isciplines movement faded, the void in the foundations o f transmissionIsm was filled with behaviorist technology. Transmission· ism was back to looking at its means again with the ends becoming of less concern. Philosophers will consider the behaviorist version of transmissioni sm Its most accept· able form, for it emphasizes individual differences in its principle that what Is reinforcing for o ne may not be so for another, and for its emphasis on positive reinforce· ment and ba. nishment of punishment. At present, behav· lorlsm seems alive and w ell. I shall return to it later.
The Romantic View of Schooling
An alternative to the transmission view, romantic per· missivism, views childhood as complete in and of itself, requiring not active intervention bu l protection from intervention; ' intervention' is equated with 'Imposition'. The earlier forms of romanticism and Its unfolding view of human development are familiar. Romanticism is often ac· cused of being based upon a biological growth metaphor, but this is inaccurate for there was no metaphor intended. Currently the romantic conception of pedagogy has taken two forms: " humanistic" education and developmentalism.
Human istic Education
Humanistic education, as it is erroneously labeled, is said to derive from third force psychology . Maslow has led the way with Rogers contributing somewhat, and Combs Influencing curriculum theory. Maslow is a neo-Aristolleian with self actualization as the Final Cause for persons; philosophically this brand of determinism will simply not wash. If leads to all sorts of blunders such as confusions over the meaning of 'can' and 'ought', and the role and nature o f free choice. His " hierarchy o f needs" grounds his straight-line determin ism, making the evaluations of alternative directions unnecessary. In surely one o f his most absurd moments he equates the development of a child with that of a flower and kitten. I will not embarrass you with an analysis of this absurdity.
K.P. Morgan once referred to Schwab as the Pied Piper of Curriculum theory,' but I have another candidate: Arthur w. Combs. As he recently put it, " The Humanistic Movement .
• . is a revolution in human though!, a necessary occurrence in the sweep of human events."' We, of course, do not know the historical scope of this neoenlightment. But it seems to be third force enlight· ment. As he sees it, we are faced with a choice between two systems of thinking: one open, one closed. We are at a fork In the road. We, In education, always seem to be at a fork or a crossroad; actually, I think we are, and have been for some time, o n a rotary.
The choice between two alternatives "commits us to quite different philosophical positions." The closed syslem depends upon a " management class," a "great man" . . . " who knows where the people sho uld go," and a " diclalorship." "Open syslems are egalitorian ... essentially democratic." In fact, as Combs puts it, From my point of view one of the comfort ing things about dealing with problems from an open system is its congruence with the democratic philosophy. My psychology is nol basically out of louch with my philosophy.
• Of course Combs is committing the either/or fallacy, but what is interesting is 1hat he knows it. He quotes Kelly: " Whenever you find Ideas expressed at opposite ends of a continuum in either/or fashion, it is almost certain they are both wrong."' Ignoring Kelly's confusion of degree and k ind, we find Combs agreeing with Kelly (which is to ag ree with confusion) and nevertheless continui ng to d iscuss his either/or reali ty.
Without belaboring l he argument, I want to simply state that the so-cal led humani stic movement In education is without inlelleclual lead ership.
Oevelopmentalism
The word 'development' under Piage t's In fl uence has taken on a special meaning . 'Development' suggests to most educationists 'develo pmentalism". The latler is a hybrid form of in nalism. Piage t Is a neo-Kantlan. Kant viewed the mind as innately struc tured In his doc trine o l synthetic a priori truths. Piaget objecls claiming that Kan t was talking about the mos t mature minds. Bui these s tructures are not in place at birth. Rather, they develop In three or four distinct stages.
But why do they develop? Children encounter ex· perience and sooner or later become disequillbraled. Their cognitive structures do nol work well at explaining experience. This does not depend on Individual purposes. Disequilibrium is solely bio logical-a dysfunctional organism-environment relationshi p.
How do these struc tures develop? Thro ugh assimilation and accommodation equilibration is reestablished. Assimilation is the process of coming at experience. It is what the person can do or make o f the environment. Accommodation Is what the environment makes of the person. Through accommodation one modifies one's structures, producing more adequate assimilations. Empiricists erred , according to Piaget, in believing that accommodation could go on without its complementary assimilations. Kant erred in the opposite direction by focusing on assimilation and omitting the point that accommodation was also going on. We might say that Kant discovered assimilation process through his trying to accommodate rationalist and empiricist thinging, while Piaget discovered accommodation by trying to assimilate both Kant's thinking and children's thinking .
Ph ilosophically, Piaget Is a neo-Kantlan committed to synthetic a priori truths. Within contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy o f mind thi s is untenable. He ignores the synthetic and analytic func tions o f belie fs. I believe that th is omi ssion is gen erated by hi s rejection of human purpose and hi s complete dependenc e on biology as the basis of knowing. The Issues here are historically wide and philosophically deep, and cannot be settled in this or any other short paper. All I want to establish is that Piagetian theory is based upo n a rationalis tic conception of mind. Serious educational theorists should not commit to Piaget's views or suggestions without careful phllo· soph ical analysis of Piaget' s basic assumptions.
• The further analysis of Piaget has to be a high agenda Item for the 1980s.
Traditional Progressivism
Under Dewey the progressive alternative took its basic shape. As I read him he sought to give a systemalic, comprehensive, consistent accoun t o f the student, pedagogy, curriculum content, and the school and Its social context. In other words, he envisioned educatlooal theory as g iving an account of four factors, which may be thought of as follows: student con text
To ignore any one of these four was to court dlsas.ter.
But how can these factors be approached theoretically? Dewey's account of educational theory was based upon lhree fundamental theoretical fac tors: education, democracy and inquiry. Again I will present a bit o f geometry. education inquiry Education is, o f course, the highest value by which all else is to be evaluated. The criterion of growth is the theoretical absolute by which all else is measured. This, by the way, is what the psychological humanism of the 1970s was in its feeble way trying to get at but could not bec ause of its ignoral of philosophy. Education was achieved, accord ing to Dewey, by inquiry on the personal level and democracy on the soc ial level. Only under the conditions of democracy is adequate inquiry possible; but this was not the argumen t. Only und er d emocratic con · ditions could the criterion o f growth be fully achieved . Democracy frees both education and inquiry. Democracy provides the social conditions for education, wh ich frees inqui ry, which allows for the reconstruc tion o f experience . . . , i.e., education.
Thro ugh philosophical analysis. Dewey tried to elaborate the natu re or these three theorellcal fac tors. Many of his writings are well -known, but, it seems, poorly understood . If I may be so brash to cri ticize In a few EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS lines his over thirty books and thousands of papers, I want to suggest that his weaknesses are to· be found in two areas; one of which I give him no responsibility-in fact he contributed very positively to it, and another which I al· tribute to him great responsibility. ThP. first of these Is educational psychology. Dewey was not practicing sci· ence yet he gave II many Important ideas. At Dewey's time educational psychology was just emerging under Thorndike who was, of course, a transmissionist. No edu· cational psychology was on the scene which was based upon progressive assumptions. Dewey was developing the progressive theory, but he could hardly be expected to develop it in all areas.
The second weakness in progressivism was of his making. In his desire to pu t together all that was separate he went, in my view, too far in his account o f inQuiry. As Chuck Brauner observes, before 1911 Dewey viewed inquiry as being of two pieces: one which served practical purposes and one which served scientific purposes. But by 1929, "Dewey welded those two approaches to ex· perimentation Into a new approach to the idea of a discipline of education."' Contemporary logic questions the sagacily of this approach. Some philosophers of science want to render asunder what Dewey sought to put together: theoretical and practical wisdom. As I shall argue, this approach has warrant. In current educational research there Is a good deal of interest in separating theoretical and "evaluation" studies. This distinction by the way has been much clearer than the old basic/applied distinc tion ever was.
Sources of a Neo-Progressivism
Stated negatively, the transmission and romantic views give us an Impetus to seek alternatives. More positively, the weakn esses in tradit ional progressive thinking are at present remedial. Contemporary psycho!· ogy and philosophy, in my view, o ffer possibi lities lor re· constructlonlng progressivism. As Ryle once said of Hume, many have mistaken his footsteps for his destina· tion, one could also say this of Dewey.
Psychological Sources
Psychological thinking during the golden age of progressivism was bifurcated into behaviorism and what Dewey called " psychologizing" the child by various forms of animism. Behaviorism has continued to grow reaching full maturity under B. F. Skin ner. G.H. Mead once com· mented that behaviorism was part of the "stimulus for a pragmatic philosophy."' There has always been an affinity between behaviorism and pragmatism; however, the two part company on the question of the role of human pur· pose and the related notion of consciousness in ex· plaining behavior. Prag mati sm viewed behavi orism as too narrow and hence incomplete.
Within the development o f psychology, there has de· veloped an alternative form of behaviorism which departs from the basic tradition from Watson to Skinner. Ban· dura's "Social Learning Theory" represents a refinement of Toulman's "purposive behaviorism" which was itself a psychological theory more in line with progressivism. I believe that Bandura's approach to psychology offers a scientific study of behavior which is based upon a metaphysics which is consistent with the earlier pro· gressive views of human nature. Furthermore, I believe that Bandura's views offer us a scientific view of learning and experience which can provide for the development of a progressive theory of education. The earlier progres·
Winter, 1980 slvlsm·s educational psychology was adumbrated but never developed into an ongoing area of scientific inquiry. I am claiming that Bandura provides us with this actual· lzed inQuiry. Thus, a soft spot In lraditional progressivism Is presently remedial. Bandura's Social Learning Theory bolsters progressive thinking and fills a gap which Dewey had to accept-but wh ich we no longer have to.
In his recent book, Social Learning Theory, Bandura briefly discusses the alternallve conceptions of social in· teraction. This attempt seems to clarify the nature of social interaction as it func llons as a basic metaphysic al framework for his sclenllflc endeavors. He claims that, " behavior, other personal factors, and environmental lac· lors all operate as interlocking de terminants of each other."
A valid criti cism of extreme behaviorism is that, in a vigorous effort to avoid spurious inner causes, it has neg lected determinants of behavior arising from cognillve functioning ... Because some of the inner causes involved by theorists over the years have been Ill-founded does not justify excluding all ln1erna1 determinants from scientific inquiry.
• Bandura is attempting to broaden the behaviorist framework by opening the metaphysical locus standi to the existence of "internal" factors without explaining behavior in terms of antecedents as various innatist theories do. He is searching for an organism-environment relationship which is not one dimensional as are both environmentalist and antecedent accounts. Note how this view Is c ongruent with the hyphenated reality view held by Dewey. That is, Dewey rejected both the innatist o r an· teceden1s view, and the rad ical envi ronmental ist view of how behavior is explained. ln natlsm locates the deter· ml nan ts o f behavior wi thin the organism, while environmentalism places these solely within the envi· ronment. Dewey argued that behavior Is best explained by appeal to, and the analyses of, the relationships which form between the organism and the environment of that organism. Consciousness is one of these relationships between an organism and a part of the environment or "situation," as Dewey called ii. Purpose is another. II seems to me that it is precisely this explanatory melhodology which Bandura and his associates are investigating.
My purpose here is not to review and critiq ue Social Learning Theory from a progressive point of view. All I want to do Is to ind icate how th is theory enhances traditional progressivism. My argument is stronger, however, lhan simply showing the theoretical compatability of Bandura and Dewey. Social Learni ng Theory is worthy of our attention for other reasons.
Skinner, in his behavioris t analysis of ord inary Ian· guage (About Behaviorism, 1974) , admits the existence o f reflective thinking but claims thal It is covert behavior which is modeled on overt behavior. "The words used to describe covert behavior are the words acquired when behaving publicaly." Skinner also claims that the observation of covert behavior is easy but does not tell us just how this is to be accomplished. For all of his careful analysis of many terms used In and around psychology, he says very little about covert behavior. Skinner's push for logical completeness seems to be having the effect of revealing an incompleteness in his theory, and possibly opening up radical behaviorism lo the arguments of trad itional progressivism. Behaviorism Is thus by no means an unassailable alternative to progressive theory.
The other contemporary alternative to the progressive metaphysical framework is the antecedent view of human nature (alias: Jnnatlsm, romantic psychology, humanistic psychology, preformationlsm, and developmentalism). As I have ind icated, the "humanistic" theoretical foundations lack cogency, and the developmentalism of Piaget is based on a philosophy which has always had its em· barrassments. In other words, either direction which the antecedent view has taken leads into the teeth of trad itional philosophical objections. Stated differently, of the th ree traditional possibilities for philosophy of psy· chology, rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism, prag· matic psychology is by no-means any weaker than its al· ternatives (objective empiricism or behaviorism and sub· jective empiricism or "humanism"), and I believe that So· c ial Learning Theory is, as a form of neoprogressivism, a good deal stronger. In other words, the psychological basis of neoprogresslvism is now emerg ing.
Philosophical Sources
As I have already indicated, I believe that the main weakness in Dewey's philosophy was his movement in logic away from his earlier distinction between practical and epistemic ends for inquiry. His holding to the ultimate value, growth, in no way undermines the warrant for separating two distinct kinds of thinking. Obviously we ex· peel that theoretical thinking will observe the criterion of growth (growth in theory); but it is also possible to view practical inquiry as also respecting the criterion of growth-thus, producing practical growth. It will be remembered that in Experience and Education Dewey argued that no other requi rements need be added to the notion of growth to justify or warrant a line of develop· ment; the criterion of growth was both necessary and suf· ficient. This argument-the argument from education or growth-separates Dewey from the maturationist or an· tecedent views of educational theory, neo-Aristotleians like Maslow and neo-Kantians like Piaget, and c learly establishes an alternative orientation or framework for educational theory. My point is that while the criterion of growth is both necessary and sufficient for judging the worthwhileness of any line of development, it does not make any line of development the only warranted one. Development can take many legitimate forms; that is, whether a child decides to become a physician, a teacher, a nuc lear engineer, or an administrator, the criterion of growth is satisfied if and only if what one learns or what habits one forms allow for continued growth. This is not a philosophy of specialization. The professions, at present, are all reviewing themselves and finding that they have in· terpreted their roles too narrowly. Dental students are, for example, being told that they do not work solely on teeth, and that they must consider how the patient thinks and feels. The practice of dentistry requires the continued growth in the techniques of dentistry of course, but it also requires growth in the knowledge and understandings of one's patients' environmental situations.
Within the context of educational inqu iry, the criterion of growth can be adhered to without forcing all In· quiry into one methodology. Theoretical and practical Inquiry are distinguishable, and this distinction does no vio· lence to the foundations of pragmatism. In fact Dew· ey's failure to retain this distinction led him to describe in his Sources of a Science of Education, 1929, a meth· odology wh ich was quite Inhibiting to the growth of the science of pedagogy.
In several papers I have tried to show that some of the arguments from philosophy of science aimed at the riddle of induction have great significance for how we view our work In education." The arguments given by Levi and Maxwell -wh ich I call the Levl·Maxwell thesis " -make it very clear that epistemic goals or ends require methods quite different from those required for the successful pursuit of practical goals. Since I have reviewed these arguments within the context o f pedagogical research elsewhere," I will here only briefly describe this approach.
What Maxwell succeeded in doing was to show us how to deal with the problems -of selecting and modifying a metaphysical framework within which empirical science may be profitably conducted. Maxwell argues against Kuhn and Popper holding that it is possible to reconstruct our assumptions about rationality in light of our research experience with them. He specifies the rules for so doing in his "metamethodology." These rules grow out of his view of science as aim-oriented; or in Levi's words, "the aims of Inquiry control the legitimacy of inferences." Thus, for both Levi and Maxwell, science must constantly be re-evaluating its goals or ends in light of scientific experience with them . Maxwell goes beyond Levi, in showing us how metaphysical assumptions are necessary for, but controlled within, scientific Inquiry.
It is clear from this literature that Levi and Maxwell are working with a means-ends analysi s of science, and are properly seen in the tradition of pragmatic philosophy. They have developed a neopragmatic analysis of scientific inquiry. Their arguments have a fairly direct bearing upon the direction and foundations of both empirical educa· tional research and philosophy of education. Since pro· gressivism in educational theory historically rested upon pragmatist conceptions of psychology and philosophy, and since there is warrant to claim that the Levi-Maxwell thesis offers a neopragmatic foundation of scientific in· quiry, I believe that there is reason to hold that the founda· lions for a neoprogressivism in educational theory are at this time in place rendering a neoprogressive view of edu· cation and schooling readi ly producible. The required neo· progressive philosophy is now in place.
Conclusion
I have tried to show the serious educationist that there are good reasons to give attention to a neopro· gressive theory of education. Ideas rooted in Dewey and enhanced by current research in psychology and philosophy provide the raw materials for us to begin to carve out a nli!w conception of school Ing for the 1980s which is worthy of a nation which has given leadership to the world in both science and democracy. The conditions are such that to view the earlier progressivism as nothing more than history, reflects an ignorance of both the past and the present. The future which this ignorance can write is not worthy of us. The intellectual elements are at hand to allow us-if we are really desirous and willing to make the great effort-to recast the schools, teaching, study· ing, and administration into forms where children and young adults will want to go to school, study, and in· quire; where teachers will want to meet their classes and tell their medical and legal counterparts that they are pub· lie school teachers; where principals and superintendents will smile at their students and teachers, and not be asking whether more armed guards are required to walk 'Ibid. ' Ibid, their halls; where parents will see the schools they pay dearly for as centers for inquiry and not the narcotics market place. I put ii to you that these things can be; but we, the educational theorists, will have to let them be 
Origins of the Modern School System
The democratization of education took place for two reasons: to provide the modern state with enlightened citizens and to train an eiflcient work force. In the nineteenth century, pol itical con· siderations predominated; educational reform w ent hand in hand with the broadeni ng of the suf· frage, the disestablishment of religion, and lhe establishment of republican Institutions. Like these other innovations, the common sc hool system grew out of the democratic revolution, which created a new type of citizenship based on equality before the law and limited government -a " government of laws, not men ." The model citizen of early republican theory knew what his rights were and de· fended them from infringement by his fellow citizens and by the state. He could not be fooled by demagogues or overawed by the the learned obfuscations of professional wise men. Appeals to authori ty left him unimpressed. Always on the aleri for forgery, he had, moreover, enoug h wordly w isdom about men's motives, understand ing of the principles of critical reasoning, and skill in the use of language to detect intellectual fraud in whatever f orm it presented itself.
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